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ABSTRACT
What did it mean to “vulgarize” in Renaissance Italy? Was it simply a
matter of translating into the vernacular, or did it mean making a
text more accessible to the people – to in some sense popularize
it? The answer is far from simple and certainly never one-sided;
therefore, each individual case needs to be independently
assessed on its own merits. This article seeks to shed some light
at least on the major treatments of the theory of vulgarization by
the likes of Ludovico Castelvetro, Faustus Longianus, Francesco
Robortello, Alessandro Piccolomini, Orazio Toscanella and
Girolamo Catena, which were central to the debate from the
1540s onwards.
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1. Introduction: translation, tradition and betrayal
What did it mean to “vulgarize [volgarizzare]” in Renaissance Italy?Was it simply a matter
of translating into the vernacular,1 or did it mean making a text more accessible to the
people2 – to in some sense popularize it?3 The answer is far from simple and certainly
never one-sided; therefore, each individual case needs to be independently assessed on
its own merits.
Transposing from one language to another and making content more accessible are two
practices which are not always easy to distinguish between. The two meanings have long
coexisted, and their polysemy is just as appreciable today as it was in the Renaissance.
What is interesting is that in this period intellectuals began to reﬂect on the process of vul-
garization itself.
In the Italian Renaissance almost any attempt to make content more accessible to a
wider public implied at least some form of translation from the classical languages into
the vernacular (when the production was not original), and this is what was meant by ren-
dering into the vernacular. With that said, however, we can make no general assumption –
at least on the basis of the cases we have knowledge of – to the eﬀect that every translation
was an instance of popularization. Either way, it is well to remember, as George Steiner
points out, that translation is never a simple and neutral transmission of a text from
one language to another; it is not a mere linguistic question, because it always produces
new knowledge.4 Hence, even when translation is not intended as popularization, by
making the text or its content more widely known – and also when a radical transform-
ation of both is involved – it nevertheless fulﬁlls the function of generating new
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knowledge.5 It is equally certain that to render a classical text into a vernacular language
greatly increases the number of its public.6
To date, studies focusing on the vulgarization process have for the most part been con-
cerned with the early phases of the Romance languages between the twelfth and fourteenth
centuries.7 Another line of inquiry focuses on the problem of translation from Greek to
Latin during Humanism,8 another still on speciﬁc geographical areas, for instance
France.9 However, almost nothing has been written on the theory of vulgarization from
classical languages to the vernacular in the Italian Renaissance.10 In the rare event that
some eﬀort has been made in this direction, scholars have been concerned primarily
with the translation of literary texts rather than philosophical and scientiﬁc texts.11
Only in recent years has there been a surge of interest in the various translation practices
that were adopted.12 So far, however, nothing systematic has come of it.
Yet there is one very good reason for studying this complex process: the Renaissance,
the Cinquecento in particular, was a time of intense blossoming of what we today call vul-
garization in all ﬁelds of knowledge, especially in terms of prose.13 In order to fully grasp
the meaning of vulgarization in the Italian Renaissance, it is therefore necessary to
examine some of the ﬁrst-hand accounts rather than focusing exclusively on a-posteriori
reconstructions, which inevitably risk distorting reality through the lens of a modern way
of looking at things. Even the classiﬁcation of vulgarization as a literary genre was late in
emerging. Few Renaissance intellectuals deﬁned their works as vulgarizations. The word
“volgarizzamento” only came into widespread use in the second half of the Seicento,
and it was not until the late Settecento and the Ottocento that this category of literary
genre really took root, albeit in a non-deﬁned kind of way.
This article therefore seeks to shed some light at least on the major treatments of the
theory of vulgarization by the likes of Ludovico Castelvetro, Faustus Longianus, Francesco
Robortello, Alessandro Piccolomini, Orazio Toscanella and Girolamo Catena, which were
central to the debate from the 1540s onwards. The role played by these authors is particu-
larly signiﬁcant, as most of them worked on the translation and vulgarization of philoso-
phical and scientiﬁc texts, which in part present a diﬀerent set of challenges from that of
purely literary and poetic works. Although making content more understandable is hardly
a concern in the case of the latter, such works do raise the problem of metrical correspon-
dence, which is absent in prose works. Even so, as we shall see, the question of preserving
certain linguistic forms in the transfer from one language to another persists.
Our reconstruction omits the question of the genres of these texts as something which is
correlated but not immediately dependent. Obviously the choice of one literary genre over
another implies a diﬀerent approach to the original text. As Alessio Cotugno has so bril-
liantly shown, it is diﬃcult to speak of vulgarization without reference to the manner in
which a text is vulgarized – in other words, the techniques of exegesis and interpretation
that are employed.14 Nonetheless, a useful distinction may still be drawn between the quid
facti of vulgarization, or how it is produced, and the quid iuris, namely the possibilities and
limitations of vulgarization. This present inquiry focuses on the quid iuris, or the theory of
the translation.
At its height, when the vernacular had established itself as a language of culture, vulgar-
ization was no longer questioned in terms of its feasibility.15 Vulgarization had long since
ceased to be the object of criticism, and indeed intellectuals such as Faustus Longianus and
Orazio Toscanella came to view the question of its validity as simply superﬂuous, even
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nonsensical. By then, vulgarization had become a well-established practice.16 The problem
of developing a theory of translation and vulgarization emerged only later, however, when
the vernacular no longer needed legitimizing as a language of culture and the notion that
vulgarizing was “extremely beneﬁcial and honorable”17 was becoming widely accepted. It
was only when vulgarizations were being printed that serious reﬂection on a theory of
translation and vulgarization began to emerge.
The most pressing concern at this stage was therefore to deﬁne the criteria and prin-
ciples according to which it was possible or even necessary to vulgarize.18 Such principles,
the quid iuris, were what made it possible to select the best vulgarization technique. This
theory of vulgarization – which to start with, at least, turned primarily on the fundamental
principles of translation – became possible only when the idea that it was necessary to
reproduce the high-register forms of Latin also in the vernacular was abandoned.19
Historians have generally tended to reduce the theory of Renaissance translation to a
single overarching dichotomy: “do we translate according to the words or the
meaning?”20 This dichotomy has often been associated with a juxtaposition between
those who are interested primarily in form, or words, and those who prefer to focus on
content, or meaning. The ﬁrst group usually includes Ludovico Castelvetro, Sebastianus
Faustus Longianus, Orazio Toscanella and Girolamo Catena. The assumption is that to
vulgarize, for these intellectuals, meant to translate in the strictest sense, in other words
to “convert [convertere]”, “transpose [transferre]”, “interpret [interpretari]” and “render
[reddere] or return”. It was therefore for the most part a word-for-word translation
(verbum pro verbo), against Leonardo Bruni’s suggestion.21 By contrast, Francesco Robor-
tello and Alessandro Piccolomini, along with many other intellectuals who were con-
cerned not so directly with the theory of translation but with actual translations or the
theory of language, for instance Sperone Speroni, Benedetto Varchi, Ludovico Dolce
and Claudio Tolomei, were more alive to content.22 For them, to vulgarize was not
merely to translate, or a word-for-word transposition, but above all a rendering of the
true sense of the author’s message, in line with Saint Jerome’s dictum “do not render
word-for-word, but express the original sense [non verbum e verbo, sed sensum exprimere
de sensu]”.
Ultimately, it was a matter of taking a stance on the question of Cicero’s theory of trans-
lation, which is based on a distinction between interpreter/translator and orator/author. In
De ﬁnibus III.15, Cicero states:
It is not necessary to squeeze out a translation word by word, as ineloquent interpreters do,
when there is a more familiar word conveying the same meaning. Indeed, I usually use several
words to expose what is expressed in Greek by one, if I am unable to do anything else.
In De optimo genere oratorum 14, his argument is subtler:
I did not translate them [Aeschines and Demosthenes] as an interpreter, but as an orator,
with the same ideas, forms and, as it were, shape, and with language ﬁtted to our usage.
In this I did not think that I should render word for word, but instead preserved every cat-
egory and the force of the words.23
This distinction quickly gained currency among rhetoricians much loved by the humanis-
tic tradition such as Horace and Quintilian,24 and came to represent the departure point
for all subsequent debate on the topic in the Renaissance period.25 What was the role of the
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true translator? That of interpreter or of author? Was Cicero right? And if so, which
Cicero?
This Ciceronian debate is often confused with the characteristically humanist debate on
the question of Ciceronianism, where the purpose was rather to discuss the adoption of a
language modeled on the style of Cicero and based on the idea of an intrinsic correspon-
dence between res and verba, content and form.26 As the focus of discussion was whether
or not it is necessary, when vulgarizing, to adhere to the words of the original text in order
to express content, a question analogous to the one about whether certain verba are
required to express certain res, the diﬀerences between these debates appeared negligible.
Hence we see that the transposition of not only terms but also linguistic structures from
the classical languages to the vernacular remained current as a subject of inquiry.27
Nonetheless, as we shall see, by the time these theories of vulgarization had taken root,
the schism in the Ciceronian res–verba dichotomy had already played itself out.28 Objects
and words were no longer on the same level, as the humanists had advocated – rather,
objects and concepts were now prior to words, a position already argued by Aristotle.29
To ask why authors in the Cinquecento made no reference to the translation theories of
the Quattrocento is thus misleading: Leonardo Bruni in his De interpretatione recta had
totally diﬀerent concerns when working on the translation from Greek to Latin in a
context without the printing press.30 It would be like asking why Bembo in his Prose scar-
cely even acknowledged the experiences of Quattrocento intellectuals such as Leon Battista
Alberti, Cristoforo Landino and Lorenzo de’ Medici, and taking him to task for maintain-
ing a certain kind of silence. Very simply, intellectuals in the Cinquecento had diﬀerent
questions and demands, as well as a profoundly altered theoretical framework to work
with.31
To reduce the whole question of vulgarization to a juxtaposition between word/
meaning and res/verba would be profoundly misguided. It would seem therefore more
proﬁtable to leave such distinctions aside for the moment, and to begin by looking at
the diﬀerent types of vulgarization.
2. Ludovico Castelvetro on “traslatare”
The ﬁrst document to oﬀer an insight into the question of the meaning of vulgarization is a
letter dated 7 May 1543 from Ludovico Castelvetro to Gaspare Calori.32 There are at least
three reasons why this document is of particular interest. Firstly, it is an early document
written by a young Castelvetro which explores in an entirely theoretical vein the possibi-
lities of translation and vulgarization. Castelvetro had yet to tackle the practical issues
involved in translating classical texts: his Poetica d’Aristotele volgarizzata e sposta came
out only in 1570.33 Secondly, the work was written at a time when the vernacular was
still struggling to establish itself as a language of culture; Sperone Speroni’s Dialogo
delle lingue had been in print for only a year, although the ideas presented in it were
already widely acknowledged, and the validity and dignity of the vernacular as a language
capable of transmitting knowledge that is not only literary but also scientiﬁc–philosophical
was under the constant scrutiny of philologists and humanists. Lastly, unlike the other
documents that are examined here, Castelvetro’s letter has the singular distinction, not
to say misfortune, of remaining unpublished until 1747 when Angelo Calogerà brought
it to light, suﬃcient reason for it not to have had any impact at all on subsequent debate.
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The letter has prompted a number of detailed studies, the purpose of most of which has
been to shed light on the body of philological knowledge that was accrued from biblical or
literary exegesis.34 What has generally been overlooked, however, is that Castelvetro
focuses his analysis on the translation of literary texts – primarily poetry. Such compo-
sitions, in Castelvetro’s view, had a single purpose: to entertain. Poetry has no other
purpose,35 and in no way may it take on the task of uncovering truth or transmitting
knowledge. This is especially true of the poetry of Virgil, which Castelvetro examines in
his letter and openly attacks later in the Poetica d’Aristotele for its intent to transmit
ideas, content and concepts that stray far beyond the remit of straightforward entertain-
ment.36 He is by no means alone in his views. Sperone Speroni held similar views in
respect of poetic compositions,37 and it is an important point to make because the
letter clearly shows that translation, too, at least in the ﬁeld of poetry, must align with
the ultimate purpose of the original. This implies the careful selection of words that are
“ornate” precisely because they must give pleasure to the listener and the reader. Even
so, it would be rash to conclude from this that every translation for Castelvetro must be
“ornate”.38
Castelvetro’s letter is built around three core themes: (1) the genetic priority of concept
over word; (2) the semantic power of concept over word; and (3) the impossibility of deriv-
ing the former from the latter. This impossibility gives rise to the single greatest issue in
translation, namely its reliability. The problem is stated in psychological terms. While it is
diﬃcult to relate a word to a concept of our own, it is well-nigh impossible to do so with a
word that replaces another word that already refers to another’s concept. The impossibility
of knowing the soul’s concepts and aﬀects – that is the intentions of the author – consti-
tutes the ﬁrst major obstacle to transmission. To transpose from one language to another is
therefore always an act of authorship, because it relates one’s own words to one’s own
concepts.
Castelvetro’s glottological approach also presents a historical–cultural problem. Each
language contains concepts that are in some way inseparable from words because through-
out the course of the centuries they have built up a certain semantic value that can be
transposed from one language to another only with great diﬃculty. These are the so-
called “untranslatables”.39
The questions relating to linguistics and the theory of translation Castelvetro raises
present no easy solutions, and one may well be lulled into seeing some kind of equivalence
between thought/concept and linguistic utterance/word – a kind of nominalism, in other
words, or one-to-one correspondence.40 This cannot be Castelvetro’s position, however,
because it would imply that only one speciﬁc word could be used to express a speciﬁc
concept, hence no translation would be possible. Far more simply, Castelvetro speaks of
a customary use of language, a kind of habitus. Just as we are accustomed to seeing
water as transparent and ﬁnd it strange to see it black, so we are accustomed to using
certain words and not others for certain concepts.41 This is true not only for translation
from one language to another, but also for periphrasis – in other words, when seeking
to explain the same concept with diﬀerent words in the same language.
Having established that it is easier to be composers or authors rather than translators,
Castelvetro goes on to deﬁne a hierarchy of values for carrying out a good translation.
Firstly, when translating it is necessary as much as possible to avoid terms that take
one directly back to the source language, which above all else means eliminating
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Graecisms and Latinisms. Castelvetro’s reasoning is that only in this manner can the ver-
nacular genuinely see itself as a language worthy of science and literature without coming
across as perennially subordinate to the classical languages. A case in point is the trans-
lation of “μίμησις” as “rassomiglianza [similarity, likeness]” or more rarely as “rappresen-
tatione [representation]”, but never with the customary “imitazione [imitation]”, which
derives from the Latin imitatio.
Castelvetro oﬀers no solution to the problem of the untranslatables, or of how to trans-
pose from one language to another concepts that are closely bound to a word without
resorting to loan-words from the source language. In such cases, which include the above-
mentioned question of the translation of “μίμησις”, Castelvetro appears to be operating –
albeit unconsciously – in a manner that is highly philosophical rather than philological.
The aim is to identify in the target language the word that best characterizes the source
concept and then translate it. This naturally implies a deep understanding of the
concept – an understanding which had hitherto remained unattainable given the impossi-
bility of reading concepts stripped of words. The best that one can do to overcome this
diﬃculty is to acquire an in-depth knowledge of the subject in question, namely the
text to be vulgarized. However philological Castelvetro’s approach may seem, and
however closely he may focus on ﬁnding the right words, it is content, or the concept,
that provides the key to his theory of translation. His works are intensely philosophical.
In his view, one must have mastered both the source and the target language because
otherwise one can give no account of the properties of translations, ﬁgures and qualities
of words. To overlook the content would mean to create the paradoxical situation of
expressing serious concepts with frivolous words, or frivolous concepts with serious
words. To translate is thus to preserve above all content, then the terminology of the
target language and, lastly, the syntax and linguistic structures of the source language.
On this basis, Castelvetro gives a reading of the passage from De optimo genere ora-
torum in which he states that Cicero refers to the role not of the translator, but of the
orator, who is concerned more with content than style.42 This might explain Cicero’s aver-
sion to word-for-word translations – but still, according to Castelvetro, Cicero is not criti-
cal of literal translation in an overall sense; rather, Cicero wishes to assert that it is possible
to adopt diﬀerent approaches to rendering a source text according to the situation. Like-
wise, Aulus Gellius in his Noctes Atticae references the author/orator and not the transla-
tor when claiming that it is not necessary to translate a source text word-for-word.43 An
author for Castelvetro is not one who dresses concepts in words for the ﬁrst time – at least,
not only this. Like so many others after him, he refers rather to the etymological meaning
of the word “author”, which translates the Latin “auctor”, from “auctus”, perfect participle
of “augeo”, meaning “to enlarge”, “to augment”, “to develop” and “to expand”. Anyone
who is not a perfect translator, therefore, is for Castelvetro an author in the sense that
he or she enlarges, augments, develops and expands the source text. It is not necessary
to be innovative to be an author; any vulgarizer who is not merely a translator is an
author, because he expands a source text, making it more transparent for the reader. As
we shall see, Alessandro Piccolomini, too, adopts the approach of being an author, not
a translator.
To conclude, there are two approaches to translation: one the interpreter’s, the other
the author’s. Translation in a strict sense is the preserve of the interpreter, who must
stick closely to the original text – and for this he must be expert not only in the
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terminology and syntactic structures of the target language but also in those of the source
language. Knowledge of concepts through the words of source-language texts is crucial for
an adequate translation using the relevant target-language terminology without inap-
propriate recourse to loan-words from the classical languages. This kind of translation
requires not only philological expertise but also a great capacity to recreate the initial
concept in other words, that is to say to understand the original concept in its most inti-
mate sense and reproduce the same intimacy of understanding in the target language. This
is why Castelvetro’s translation of Aristotle’s Poetics, aside from its critical apparatus, is
not only philologically accurate but also a model of conceptual translation that represents
the high point of his philosophical career.
3. Faustus Longianus on translating according to Cicero
Castelvetro’s perspective is taken further by Sebastianus Faustus Longianus in his dialogue
Del modo de lo tradurre d’una in altra lingua segondo le regole mostrate da Cicerone (1556),
prompting Werther Romani to advance the not implausible hypothesis that there was in
fact some kind of student–teacher relationship between the two.44 Be that as it may, Del
modo de lo tradurre is the ﬁrst published Renaissance work in the vernacular on the
theory of translation. Bodo Guthmüller has already provided an admirable textual and
contextual analysis of the dialogue,45 hence it is suﬃcient here simply to recall its theor-
etical relevance. The title itself clearly shows how the author’s aim is to give an account of
the method of translation advocated by Cicero rather than putting forward a general view
of what it means to translate or vulgarize.
The ﬁctional dialogue begins with the story of two intellectuals engaged in defending
what they see to be the real task of the translator, namely that of interpreter or orator
according to Cicero’s text. In other words, Faustus Longianus is asking whether it is
right to translate word-for-word or according to meaning.46 In order to take a stance in
this debate, it is necessary from the outset to state what translation actually is and how
it may be distinguished, for example, from metaphrasis, paraphrase, summary,
comment, exposition and explanation – in other words, from the other modes of
vulgarization.
Metaphrasis is, in Faustus Longianus’s view, a form of popularization47 – whether in
the same language or a diﬀerent one – which comes close to translating according to
meaning, so that, in his words, “nowadays it is used by many, but under the name of trans-
lation”.48 However, it refers only to “meaning or the shadow of meaning” – in other words,
“it is not obliged to the purity of the meaning of the words”.49 It can however be a powerful
means of distorting the message of a text, and indeed it “ampliﬁes, diminishes, confuses,
transposes, disturbs, obscures, so that the main author would no longer recognize it as his
own”.50 The meaning can be transformed to such a degree that the original author ﬁnds
himself on a par with a secondary author who may even bring another meaning to the text.
Hence metaphrasis, whose purpose should be to adapt and explain the content to a wider
audience, can end up perverting it instead. Elsewhere, Faustus Longianus speaks of
metaphrasis in terms of an illustration (illustratitione) “which is not bound to any law
of meaning or of words”.51
Like metaphrasis, paraphrase “can be carried out in the same language or in another
one”.52 It is in every sense a form of vulgarization because “its strength consists in clarifying
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the meaning of that which is ambiguous or obscure with a greater number of words”.53
Unlike metaphrasis, therefore, paraphrase always remains close to the meaning intended
by the author. Because of this, and because of its capacity to clarify content, paraphrase
for Faustus Longianus is “extremely diﬃcult, and not everyone can do it”.54
Another form of vulgarization is the summary, or epitome, the purpose of which is to
aid memory and ensure that only the most salient content is reported. Yet it is precisely in
this selection of content that Faustus Longianus sees the greatest risk in the act of summar-
izing, which is liable “sometimes to cause no small amount of damage”.55 Selection can
result in important content being left out or a message that is diﬀerent from the
author’s intended message being conveyed. Hence the best summary is the one that
follows the author’s intended meaning.
The ﬁnal form of vulgarization examined by Faustus Longianus is the explanation
(ispianatione) or “ispositione, commentario, narratione, isplicatione”. Its purpose is to
declare meanings, manifest the secrets of the art, resolve contradictions, clarify ambiguities,
grasp the most plausible opinion in a controversy, publish stories and hidden fables, show the
signiﬁcations and virtues of words, apportion reason, discover their sources, observe their
elocution.56
In other words, ispianatione serves to make the content of a text more plain, clear and
understandable, and in this sense is an example of genuine vulgarization, even though
“it may be undertaken both in one’s own language and in that of others”.57
Unlike all other ways of approaching a text, to translate means above all to interpret,
convert and transpose faithfully from one language to another. In all other cases the orig-
inal text may be modiﬁed in its own language.58
Translation is part of a wider psychological process based on a word–thing dichotomy
of Aristotelian derivation: “any utterance that has ever been made or will ever be made by
anyone anywhere in the world by voice or in writing consists of nothing more than two
elements: things and words”.59 Things, meaning “statements, senses, feelings, matters,
concepts, are considered ﬁrst”, prior to words, which are only an ornament to them;
the priority is to preserve “the order of things”, meaning concepts – that is to say, to
not alter the sense of the original author’s argument.60 Faustus Longianus is aware that
“truth gets lost in diﬀerences, hence it is necessary gently to reason and make every
eﬀort to gain knowledge of the thing”.61 Translation is always a betrayal, yet – despite
this inescapable drawback of the translation process – a translator must spare no eﬀort
in revealing the truth of a text. Before anything else in the translation, the content must
be preserved – and only subsequently is it possible to apply “the same forms and
ﬁgures, or conformations, […] ornaments, […] or patterns”.62 It is therefore necessary
to translate “with appropriate words and beyond that to preserve the virtue, the force
and the value of the words of the language from which one is transposing”.63 This
means that words play a crucial role as a “garment” for concepts, and indeed Riccardo
Drusi has argued for the existence “of an essential relationship between language and con-
cepts, so that the word is a substance, not a vehicle, of the argument it expresses”,64 which
is reminiscent of what has already been asserted by Castelvetro. Nonetheless, the bias in
the relationship between concepts and words is still tilted in favor of concepts.
In the case of pure translation, however, the task should be to “stay within the words if
possible and express the meaning”.65 In other words, for Faustus Longianus translation
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should be word-for-word, if in such a manner the meaning may be conveyed. This is why
he interprets Horace’s “nec verbum verbo curabis reddere ﬁdus / interpres” as follows: “you,
who want to be a faithful interpreter, will not be concerned with translating word-for-
word, but will consider only the meaning”.66 “Interpreter” here does not mean “transla-
tor”, however, because otherwise you would no longer have the priority of the word-
for-word translation. In this case, as in many others, “interpreter” is used by Faustus Long-
ianus in its most commonly accepted meaning, which it retains to this day, of one who
reveals in the best possible way the meaning of the source text as it is understood.67 Else-
where he refers to the ﬁgure of the interpreter as an imitator, in opposition to the trans-
lator.68 This discrepancy between translator and imitator gives some sense of how the
problem of vulgarization is both anchored and unhinged by the problem of the imitation
of Ciceronianism in the decades that spanned the ﬁfteenth and sixteenth centuries. During
this time, an “imitator” was one who followed the linguistic forms and structures of Latin,
whereas for Faustus Longianus it is one who simply follows the overall meaning of the text.
Ideally, however, a translation should be word-for-word. Clearly this is not easily
achieved: there is recognition of the fact that “each language has its own usages, beauties,
splendors, which do not correspond to those of other languages”.69 Hence in order to
translate literally it is important to understand the meaning of the text, and to know
both the language into which one is translating and the language from which one is trans-
lating. Whoever is unable to overcome these three diﬃculties will necessarily resort to
translating according to meaning.70 It has been noted that his quibble here most likely
has a speciﬁc target in mind, namely the anonymous translator of the Epistole famigliari
di Cicerone, whose work appeared the year after Faustus Longianus’s own translation.71 In
its dedicatory letter, the process of translation is clearly represented as a vulgarization that
seeks to transmit concepts rather than words. The reasoning runs counter to Faustus
Longianus’s: anyone who does not understand the concepts, so the argument goes,
“opts to follow the path of the words [… ] attends only to the voices”.72 It is often the
case that those who do not understand the meaning of a text, and here the reference is
to Faustus Longianus, go no further than the words, and so the “translation, which was
discovered to make explicit otherwise hidden information, proves to be even more
obscure”.73 Translation is a form of vulgarization for the anonymous translator both
because it must render into the vernacular and because it must clarify that which is
obscure. The juxtaposition between the perspectives of the anonymous translator and
Faustus Longianus is ﬁctitious, however, an artiﬁce created by the anonymous translator
speciﬁcally to justify a new translation only one year on. As we have seen, translating
word-for-word is possible and advisable for Faustus Longianus only where it is not at
the expense of conveying the sense. Adherence to the text is important, but it must not
constitute a betrayal of its sense.
In his Dialogo de lo modo di tradurre, Faustus Longianus identiﬁes two general forms of
vulgarization: those that simplify the understanding of a text – despite the problems that
this too can sometimes cause – including metaphrasis, paraphrase, summary and ispiana-
tione; and those that render the text into the vernacular, that is translation according to
sense and literal translation. Vulgarization in the sense that simple texts which are also
translated into the vernacular can be metaphrases, paraphrases, summaries and ispiana-
tioni if and only if they are in the vernacular. Translation, on the other hand – even
though is not necessarily a clariﬁcation, since it represents a transition from a dead
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classical language to a living vernacular language – allows for a greater degree of com-
munication of the content of the text.
4. Francesco Robortello on vulgarization
As the founder of Renaissance historiography and modern criticism with his In librum
Aristotelis De arte poetica explicationes (1548) and De historica facultate (1548), Francesco
Robortello is not known for his theory of vulgarization. Nonetheless, it is a topic he devel-
oped in at least two distinct ways. The ﬁrst concerns the manner of translating from one
language into another and explains how to make philosophical discourse “popular”, be it
in Latin or vernacular. It is dealt with in the manuscript Del translatare d’una lingua in
l’altra (c. 1552).74
In this work Robortello distinguishes between two kinds of vulgarization: one concern-
ing the sciences, the other common speaking. For Robortello this distinction comes from
the ﬁrst book of Aristotle’s Rhetorica, where the Stagirite deals with the possibility of
speaking according to either the “common place” or the “proper place” of a particular
science or art.75 Robortello understands this doctrine of Aristotle’s as a theory of vulgar-
ization, which can be scientiﬁc or common to a greater or lesser degree. While in Aristo-
tle’s mind “common” means general or universal, for Robortello it has come to mean
“popular”.76 Robortello’s conceptual shift is evident from his distinction between scientiﬁc
and common speaking.77 Common speaking is therefore like a plain that may easily be
traversed, in that it is easy to understand and learn, while scientiﬁc speaking is like an intri-
cate vineyard, often repetitive and hard to understand. Sciences must be translated dis-
tinguishing universal and scientiﬁc terms such as “substantia”, “qualitas” and
“predicamentum”, still nowadays valid, from ancient words such as “toga”, “paludamen-
tum” and “logio”. Universal and scientiﬁc terms, Robortello states, “must be translated
in our language in terms coined by the translator according to the meaning of the
word, that is, orator, ‘dicitore’”.78 As much as possible Robortello wishes to avoid the
wholesale use of Graecisms and Latinisms, preferring rather to search for the equivalent
vernacular terms that best express the essence of the concept. In this sense, Robortello
is very close to Castelvetro. Unlike Castelvetro, however, Robortello distinguishes
between a number of diﬀerent levels of translation precisely because translation is not
merely the transposition of words from one language to another, but involves a wider
process of vulgarization. Scientiﬁc terms can be translated into “our” popular terms, or
into “our” terms that are not in current usage, or into ancient terms that have been “popu-
larized or accepted by people out of necessity”, or into ancient terms that are “not made
popular”. What is important for Robortello is that these terms must in every instance be
comprehensible to all. But he also takes this distinction a step further.
Ancient terms that refer to the same thing must be translated with vernacular terms.
For example, “ephippium” must be translated with “sella [saddle]”, but ancient terms
that are similar to those ordinarily employed must be preserved using vernacular
diction, such as “due sesterzi” or “cinquanta ducati”, thus preserving a Latinized vocabu-
lary in the vernacular. Alternatively, if there is no correspondence in terms of terminology
or content, it is necessary to preserve ancient words as they are. This is important for
Robortello especially in connection with ancient arts and sciences which have speciﬁc
terms and subjects no longer current. This explains in general the strategy for using
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Greek and Latin words in vernacular texts: it is not because the beneﬁciaries of these texts
are more learned, but because there is no other way to teach the people, if not by indicating
with precision what no longer exists and what had its own speciﬁc term. Only thus,
according to Robortello, is it possible to disseminate knowledge easily and to educate
people.
Common speaking proceeds, on the other hand, by means of simple words, locutions
and metaphors. Simple words do not constitute the diﬃculty of translation, while locu-
tions may be of diﬀerent kinds. Proper or ordinary locutions like “conticuere omnes [all
were silent]” can be translated without diﬃculty into the vernacular.79 Locutions of cir-
cumstance, if there are analogous vernacular terms, must be translated thus – otherwise
they can remain in the original language. For instance, the locution of circumstance
“Diﬀugere nives, redeunt iam gramina campis [The snow has ﬂed; already the grass is
returning to the ﬁelds]” can be translated, but such expressions sound infelicitous in
the vernacular.80 Fabular locutions (locuzioni fabulari) such as “indulgere genio” or
“Bacchus amat colles” are readily translatable.81 Metaphors must be translated only if
there are words analogous to the ancient ones, otherwise they do not need to be translated
– although one should ﬁnd in one’s own language equally eﬀective metaphors so that the
knowledge may fully be understood.
Robortello’s conception of the translation of knowledge is far from simple: one must
translate, it is true, but not always, not necessarily and not unconditionally. There are
various ways of translating, and various linguistic registers must be adopted in order to
render in the best possible way the sense of what is being translated. This means not
only remaining faithful to the original, which for Robortello is the main priority in
terms of acquiring reliable knowledge, but also being understood by a wider public. Robor-
tello’s theory of translation is therefore a genuine product of his idea of the popularization
of knowledge, but also of his philological approach, which demands high-quality knowl-
edge, not cheaply bartered goods.
From this idea derives also the conception of how to vulgarize – in other words, in this
case, how to make a philosophical discourse popular.82 Robortello’s underlying Aristote-
lianism plugs into Cicero’s theory of the orator as translator, or vulgarizer. For this reason
his whole discourse on vulgarization centers on the problem of rhetoric, which for Robor-
tello is useful for making philosophical discourse more understandable and popular
among a wider public: a philosophical discourse is that which is constituted by words,
such as universal terms, that are little known to the populace; and on the contrary,
popular discourse is that which refers directly to things whose words are instantly com-
prehensible and shared by all. For Robortello rhetoric is particularly necessary in edu-
cation and teaching, in other words as a means of introducing everyone to the
knowledge of things.
Rhetorical discourse, which deals with truth, is speciﬁcally called “oratorical” in the
Ciceronian sense, which sees in the orator the vulgarizer of knowledge. Unlike the dis-
course of philosophy, oratorical discourse must have a certain degree of eloquence for
Robortello. In fact, it has the task of making knowledge clear and giving the populace
the opportunity to judge “concretely” the truth or falsity of what has been seen.83 In
order to convey truth, philosophy usually employs a sophisticated process, capable of gen-
erating knowledge for the populace. The oratorical method, conversely, is suitable for
popularizing philosophy because it starts from probable premises – or at least from
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY REVIEW 11
what may be taken to be true by the populace, since the populace itself can start from a
common and shared body of knowledge and then further reﬁne what it has learned.84
Not all knowledge can be popularized, according to Robortello. Indeed, there are some
disciplines such as jurisprudence, mathematics and theology which in themselves can also
be eloquent but which common people ﬁnd it diﬃcult to get used to, primarily because
they employ so many technical and speciﬁc terms that cannot be made popular.85 This
has given rise to the belief that Robortello maintains the idea of possible popularization
purely for certain topics that are of ordinary interest to people. Not only in such instances
do common people learn in a peculiar manner: they acquire knowledge exclusively
through oratorical discourse, which is limited neither by brevity nor by the use of
speciﬁc technical terms. In general, however, Robortello points out that it is important
to follow the rules when explaining the speciﬁc terms of the various arts and sciences,
referring ﬁrst to the Greek and Latin meanings and then giving a translation in the
common language.86
In De artiﬁcio dicendi Robortello maintains that there are four ways of making a phi-
losophical discourse popular, in other words of transforming an intellectually challenging
philosophical text in order to make it relevant to a wider audience. The ﬁrst of the four
ways is to make an abstract notion more concrete, which is possible thanks to the rhetori-
cal inference of the example. The second way is to transform a universal concept into a
particular concept: the orator does not deal with happiness in terms of its deﬁnition,
but with regard to the happy man.87 The third is speaking of philosophical concepts by
means of metaphor. The fourth is to employ many words and phrases, that is circumlocu-
tion, to explain and clarify a philosophical concept. A philosopher should not overdo
words and metaphors, thereby risking falling into error and making the discourse more
obscure, but the orator can use this technique to explain more than once and more eﬀec-
tively notions that are not completely clear to the populace.88
Rhetoric for Robortello is a tool for reaching a wider audience, and popularizing, vul-
garizing and translating are ﬁrst of all processes by means of which the public’s level of
knowledge may be raised without reducing high culture to a lower level.89
5. Alessandro Piccolomini on translation
Never having attempted a translation into the vernacular, Robortello presents a view that
is entirely theoretical. Alessandro Piccolomini, however, explored practically every concei-
vable form of vulgarization during the course of his life. His theoretical considerations may
be found in the Epistola ai lettori del modo del tradurre, published in Piena, et larga par-
afrase nel terzo libro della retorica d’Aristotele (1572).90
The roots of Piccolomini’s theory of vulgarization reach back into Aristotelian psychol-
ogy. He is convinced that the concepts of the mind –meaning the passions of the soul – are
the same in all human beings and that they have psychological priority over words. Indeed,
words are found only to give expression to concepts, not vice versa. At the same time, con-
cepts form the primary content of texts and, hence, those engaged in vulgarizing should
work so that “their preservation be kept always clean, immaculate, inviolable and in no
way altered”.91 To change concepts when vulgarizing can lead to the interpolation
of the voice of a second author into the text, who “would come to write his own things
[… ] would stray into the vice of falsifying [… and] would make others say what they
12 M. SGARBI
do not say”.92 The priority for Piccolomini, as it was for Castelvetro and Faustus Longia-
nus, is therefore to preserve the concepts. A more diﬃcult proposition is to maintain the
locution, “which consists of words and structure and in the links between them”, because
every language has its own speciﬁc variety.93
Concepts may be vulgarized in diﬀerent ways: “translating, commenting, in other
words explaining, annotating, paraphrasing and summarizing”.94 Of all these methods,
the most diﬃcult – which, in Piccolomini’s opinion, is also the one to avoid – is trans-
lation. The perfect translation “forces one to maintain and preserve not only the opinions
of others, but also their words”, an operation which, as we have said, is extremely diﬃcult
to achieve.
The pitfalls are manifold. In Piccolomini’s view, if one does not translate but instead
limits oneself to commenting, paraphrasing, summarizing and/or annotating, one requires
expertise only in the source language, not so much the target language, because these
forms of vulgarization do not require adherence to the original and therefore the words
can be less rigorously selected. Vulgarization generally, when not pure translation,
allows the sentences to be expressed more eﬀectively – broken down, simpliﬁed and
modiﬁed – so that the eﬀect the author intended becomes more understandable in the
target language. Hence vulgarization does not require “an exceedingly close familiarity
with the language”.95 On the contrary, in translation absolute correspondence between
source and target languages is required.
Translation has another limitation. In every form of vulgarization, from comment to
paraphrase, the vulgarizer may be accused of betraying the author. In comments and para-
phrases, however, a betrayal may be viewed as an instance of bad interpretation, a form of
accusation mitigated by the common practice – in these types of vulgarization – of the vul-
garizer speaking in the ﬁrst person. With translation, however, as mentioned above, the
vulgarizer is never accused of bad interpretation: he can only be a falsiﬁer.
Piccolomini’s preference for types of vulgarization other than translation is also dic-
tated by practical concerns. Translations are so diﬃcult, especially those that set them-
selves “to convey from one language into another scientiﬁc and doctrinal material”, that
often the translator simply ends up displaying his ignorance of the subject and his
inability to use the appropriate language.96 In other words, Piccolomini takes issue
with the approach of literal translation carried out by translation professionals who
are not experts in the subjects they are meant to vulgarize, rendering texts virtually
incomprehensible.
Unlike other forms of vulgarization we have seen, translation must not only remain
faithful to the mind of the author but must also “preserve as much as possible his
words and locution and links, and his thought patterns” without needing to further
amplify or order sentences.97 Adherence to the source language can sometimes produce
a translation that is “more obscure or more confused”, and ultimately “pointless and
vain”, therefore bearing “no fruit whatsoever”.98 Piccolomini’s argument here is with
the translation of Aristotle’s Poetics by Ludovico Castelvetro.99 Piccolomini even goes
on to add that translators of scientiﬁc texts working from Greek into Latin, or from
Greek into Latin and then into vernacular, even when extremely well versed in the
content, frequently in attempting to stay close to the word of the original fail to achieve
the ultimate aim of the translation, which is to vulgarize – in other words, to make the
content more understandable:
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some [… ] without conveying, as they should, primarily the sentence and the sentiment,
proceed word-by-word, minimal particle by minimal particle, seeking to reproduce the
exact rhythm they ﬁnd [… and] end up producing a kind of confused and insipid locution,
and what is worse, [one that is] for the most part unintelligible [… they render] the sentence
obscure, intricate and often false, and, what is worse, as I have said, diﬃcult to draw any sense
from.100
Moreover, Piccolomini rejects the position of those who do not wish to make any kind of
modiﬁcation to the original text and end up formulating new words in order to consolidate
meaning, thus creating “barbarisms”. He also attacks the practice of those who attribute
the meaning of one word to another, and in so doing mislead the reader.101
To conclude, it is by no means the case that Piccolomini rejects translation as a type of
vulgarization; he simply believes it to be more diﬃcult to produce. As with all the other
theoreticians of vulgarization and translation, what must be preserved above all else in
scientiﬁc works is the content. In Piccolomini, more than elsewhere, one perceives the
inﬂuence of his experiences in the Accademia degli Inﬁammati, where a concept was
suﬃcient to gain access to content. The other authors considered thus far, as with those
still to follow, believe that in order to access the truth and make the concept understand-
able it is necessary to restore the word to its full originality.
6. Orazio Toscanella and the Discorso del tradurre
Anyone expecting to ﬁnd an original theoretical position in Orazio Toscanella will most
likely be disappointed. The ideas he develops in his Discorso del tradurre, published in
1575, are not dissimilar to those of his contemporaries. As with Faustus Longianus, the
choice as to whether or not to translate and vulgarize needs no justiﬁcation for Toscanella:
everyone “knows that transposing authors from one language to another is both extremely
beneﬁcial and highly honorable; for this reason I need spend no eﬀort demonstrating
it”.102 Moreover, for Toscanella the problem of vulgarization, as he himself addresses it,
is restricted to translation – and, in particular, to the translation of philosophical and
scientiﬁc texts.
From this perspective, the essential element that the translator must seek to preserve
before all others is the content. Indeed, Toscanella’s ﬁrst requirement is that the translator
be an expert in the subject he is translating, lest the end product turn out to be of extremely
poor quality: “if someone who is not a philosopher started translating works of philos-
ophy, and someone who is not an astrologer works of astrology, there is no question
that he would reap criticism rather than applause, and in no small measure”.103 But it
is not merely a problem of content: there is also the matter of terminological appropriate-
ness, since the various sciences use diﬀerent vocabularies and to mix them up would be to
distort the translation – hence his advice that “no one should undertake the translation of
something that is outside of their profession”.104
Unlike Piccolomini, Toscanella believes that the translator not only requires an extre-
mely extensive knowledge of the source language but also an “excellent taste for the
language into which the thing is being translated”.105 Nonetheless, he sets no distance
between himself and the other theorizers of the time when he asserts that the translator
must have a good grasp of “the topics addressed by the author that he intends to
translate”.106
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Having advanced such general considerations, Toscanella then returns to the passage
from Horace so dearly loved by Faustus Longianus: “nec verbum verbo curabis reddere
ﬁdus / interpres”. Toscanella distinguishes between the imitator, known also as the
orator, and the interpreter or translator. Despite a close “kinship” between the two, “the
imitator must not remove the words and the objects of the one he is imitating […] but
while imitating well he must use a diﬀerent invention, disposition and location from
that of the person he is imitating”.107 The imitator must therefore be seen more generally
as a kind of vulgarizer who is not bound to the letter of the author but, rather, is occupied
with ensuring that the content is perfectly understandable. By contrast, the interpreter
“must be faithful, because his law is to explicate word-for-word, according to the proper-
ties of Latin or Greek or another language”: he is therefore an “explicator and transla-
tor”.108 The use of the verb “explicate” by Toscanella must not lead us into the error of
seeing a false correspondence between the translator and he who provides explanations,
clariﬁes and makes content understandable. The latter is only and properly an imitator,
or – in more explicit terms – a commentator. The task of the interpreter or translator
is to explicate in the sense of the Latin verb “explicare”, meaning to render a discourse
in the vernacular following the rules of the source language. Hence in Horace’s passage
“interpres” is not properly speaking the interpreter, but the imitator or orator, so that
the sense of the sentence may be translated as “do not expend yourself translating
word-for-word like a faithful interpreter, just imitate”.109
The task of the real translator is to stick rigorously to the words. He must translate lit-
erally and not “(as others would have it) according to substance”.110 The openly polemical
“as others would have it” is probably directed at Piccolomini, but this does not mean that
Toscanella is giving priority to words over content. The translator must be as faithful as
possible to the words, because words represent things and diﬀerent words represent
diﬀerent things. In this Toscanella displays a naturalistic view of language, rather like Cas-
telvetro: he believes that certain concepts remain perennially unchanged and stand in a
univocal relationship with certain words. Unlike Castelvetro, however, when translating,
the same concept should be translated with the vernacular term that most closely corre-
sponds to the original word, not concept, in the target language. But Castelvetro prefers
terms that are not calques of the source language if the translator can identify alternatives
in the target language that appear to be more suited to expressing the concept. If concepts
are essentially more or less the same, then the words that are used should also be more or
less the same. For example, whereas Castelvetro prefers to translate “imitare” with “rep-
resent”, Toscanella prefers ﬁrst “imitate” and then “represent”.111 Likewise, “cognitio”
was to be translated primarily with “conoscenza”, using “intelligenza” only as a secondary
option.112 There are plenty of such cases in the Prontuario di voci volgari et latine, a text
which has been unjustly neglected by historians of language. In his Discorso, Toscanella
points out that the target language must not only reﬂect the “quality of the words” but
also the “quantity of their syllables, and the position where they are collocated”.113 For
instance, “lucidus” must be translated with “lucido” rather than “chiaro”, not merely
because of the quality of the word but also because of the number of syllables: “lucido”
has three syllables like “lucidus”, whereas “chiaro” has only two. “Lucidus” could also be
translated with “lucente”, which has the same number of syllables – but “lucido” is pre-
ferred nonetheless “out of respect for the nature of its syllables, which in ‘lucente’ are
long and in ‘lucido’ are short”.114 The correspondence must be of such quality and
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detail that not only must the words and syllables be the same in number and of the same
length in order to deliver the same timing and the same level of harmony, but the words
themselves must be positioned in the very same place within the sentence: the translator is
“obliged to position the translated vernacular verb where the Latin verb is, the noun where
the noun is, the pronoun where the pronoun is, and so on with all other parts of the
discourse”.115
This level of correspondence must be maintained regardless of the diﬀerences between
languages:
the Moors, the Persians, the Indians, the Arabs, the Chaldeans, the Greeks, the French, the
Spanish, the Italians, and all the others use diﬀerent languages, yet each in his own language
has the words to name practically every single thing.116
In other words, “each nation has sufﬁcient words to express almost all things”.117 What is
striking about Toscanella’s argument is not so much the fact that each language is sufﬁ-
cient and therefore worthy of expressing anything, but rather the failure to acknowledge
the link between the progress of knowledge and the development of language, as though
language did not evolve with the advancement of knowledge and was itself static – a link
that is very clear in Piccolomini. Since knowledge is no different from that of the Latins –
in other words, since content and concepts are the same – in Toscanella’s view there is no
problem with using words in the vernacular that correspond to words in Latin.
What matters most to Toscanella is to be as faithful as possible to the original text.
Sometimes, in order to sustain such faithfulness, the translator may use obsolete words
or refer to things that no longer exist and are therefore diﬃcult to understand. This
may be achieved if and only if “he has some support, and knows that someone else has
used them” or that they can be “received and tolerated”.118 Moreover, if certain words
cannot be translated into the vernacular “they can be left without blame, just as they
are, in the same way as the translators of Greek into Latin left certain Greek words as
they were”.119 If it is not possible to adhere so closely to the text because certain concepts
and ideas would prove incomprehensible, the translator may use “periphrasis, or meta-
phor”, or other rhetorical devices that will render a text more intelligible.120 Such tech-
niques, such “roundabout expressions”, must not be overused, however, because
“simple things in every language may be called in simple ways”.121
Toscanella seems somewhat critical of those who, with the excuse of making a text more
understandable, want to embellish it with ornate “ﬁgures and selected concepts” when
translating. This operation makes sense – but not always. Using a colorful metaphor, Tos-
canella claims that a prostitute will not necessarily appear more beautiful the better
dressed she is. On certain occasions her garments will prove inappropriate – for instance,
for a marathon, her ornaments should be set aside. Likewise, “those garments and those
jewels and ornaments that make some things extremely beautiful, are unbecoming to
others”.122 It is futile and vain for Toscanella to reiterate that the translator must
respect the nature of translated things: this is the fundamental principle of translation,
otherwise the translator would not even undertake the task. Ultimately, it appears
obvious to him that translation has the purpose of making content known and is not
merely a literary and linguistic exercise. With that said, the special edge that translation
has is its complete faithfulness to the source text. On the other hand, it is his view that
anyone who states that sentences written in the classical languages cannot be translated
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into the vernacular in a way that is just as beautiful and reﬁned is eﬀectively saying that
“the Tuscan language is not poor, but exceedingly poor, and that it cannot reach the
meaning of the Latin language without roundabout expressions”.123 In other words, for
Toscanella this is tantamount to questioning the value of the vernacular as a language
of culture capable of competing with Greek and Latin.
At the end of his Discorso, Toscanella ﬁnally shows his cards when he says “that the
translator must preserve the same invention, the same disposition and the same locution
observed by the author”.124 He does not deny the importance of transmitting the content,
something he considers to be beyond question, but he focuses more on the language and
the style – in other words, on the rhetoric of translation.
7. Girolamo Catena on the translation of sciences
Another advocate of this view who has experienced something of a comeback in recent
years, albeit more in the context of comparing contemporary translation theories than
providing genuine historical contextualization, is Girolamo Catena.125 Compared to the
authors examined previously, the theoretical inﬂuence of Bembo is far stronger in
Catena. In his letter of 27 July 1583 addressed to the Archbishop of Otranto, Marcello
Acquaviva, Catena rebuts the identiﬁcation of the vernacular with the language of the
people, as does Bembo himself in his Prose della volgar lingua. The true vernacular is
not Italian, or Tuscan, or Florentine, but the Florentine codiﬁed by the great writers of
the Trecento such as Petrarch and Boccaccio. When writing in the vernacular, therefore,
the rules laid out by these authors must always be followed:
it is not permitted to change and write according to one’s own caprice, ﬁshing from the scum
of the populace and the plebs, as so many modern writers do […] who betimes write and
teach something worthwhile when imitating Petrarch and Boccaccio, and following their
example; but at others prove themselves to be both lacking and crude.126
From this it is clear that vulgarization must follow “the manners of ﬁgurative speaking and
the compositions of voices” – or, in other words, it must contain a degree of rhetoric.127
Catena had already outlined some of these ideas in his Discorso sopra la traduttione
delle scienze, & d’altre facultà, published in 1581, where he applied them speciﬁcally to
the translation of scientiﬁc–philosophical texts and Scripture. The work opens by
making a clear distinction between interpreter/translator and imitate/orate, concluding
that “it is not necessary to use many words to talk about something”.128 Although his
observation appears self-evident, Catena returns repeatedly to this contrast throughout
his Discorso with a view to diﬀerentiating between generic forms of vulgarization and
speciﬁc forms of translation.
The primary aim, however, is to deﬁne the purpose of translation, which can only be to
“beneﬁt others by highlighting those authors who by universal consent have been approved
and considered perfect, so that we may learn from them the true manner of composing and
learning the right doctrine”.129 Catena thus reveals his main concerns: ﬁrstly, to learn to
compose in a certain manner and, secondly, to learn good doctrine. The rhetorical and sty-
listic factor is not separate from the content, but it does enjoy a certain priority over it – at
least initially. It is therefore no surprise that for Catena “the proper translation and interpret-
ation of the authors in their doctrines was [… ] word-for-word”.130 Translating word-for-
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word means essentially “to preserve the ﬁgures and the same order of things”, thus prioritiz-
ing rhetoric over content.131 The content may be conveyed only through a perfect rendering
of the words. Hence, he asks: “who will give me the true science of Plato or Aristotle if he
does not restrict himself to interpreting word-for-word?”132 Only the words render the true
meaning because they give back the concepts.
Free translation, on the other hand, constantly fuels the suspicion that the author may
not actually have said what has been translated. How, asks Catena, can one learn to write
poetry like Virgil if the translator “translates less than faithfully? In this manner I would be
imitating the translator, not the author”.133 The example is signiﬁcant because it concerns
poetry rather than scientiﬁc prose. Whether or not this rule is universal is an entirely legit-
imate question, and quickly receives an aﬃrmative answer:
it has always been agreed among the experts that in the public schools one reads the ancient
translations of Aristotle, whether by Boethius or others, never a modern one […] since the
translations of the moderns, for all that they are cleaner and more ornate, precisely because of
their ornaments lose the true sentiment of the author.134
Following the words is therefore the only way to gain access to the truth of the text: the
truth reveals itself through the words, not only through concepts. Hence “the sciences
and the doctrines and even more so the Holy Scriptures must be translated according
to the words, even when the outcome would prove less easy on the ear than one’s own
composition or an imitation”.135
It is therefore necessary to distinguish between the “simple interpreter”, meaning the
translator, and the “interpreter orator”. Few in Catena’s view have even noticed this dis-
tinction, especially among the early translators of “the Metamorphosis of Ovid and the
works of Virgil, the comedies of Plautus and Terentius and other works of primary impor-
tance such as the Ethics of Aristotle and others”.136 The most likely suspects are Giovanni
Andrea dell’Anguillara, Alessandro Piccolomini, Ludovico Dolce and Giovanni Fabrini,
who stand accused of replacing the voices of the classical authors with their own.137
Hence Catena’s desire to make the distinction clearer. The “simple translator ﬁnds for
each word its correspondent, and orders them in the same way, rigorously preserving their
form, in other words the layout of the sentences and likewise all the ﬁgures”.138 The trans-
lator/orator is diﬀerent from the simple translator because by “using ﬁgures and words
that are appropriate to the applications and customs of the language into which he is trans-
lating, he has no need to count the words”.139 The translator/orator is therefore distinct
from the simple translator because he follows the rhetoric of the discourse, but not the
same words. The translator/orator is not be confused with the orator, or imitator, as
was the case in the authors we examined earlier. To translate as an orator is diﬀerent
from being an orator.
There are also translators who consider themselves translator/orators, but in fact are not:
some, believing they are illustrating places, add their own inventions to such a degree that
they corrupt the art, and what there is that is good, and the work they have accomplished
is not translation nor imitation nor comment nor paraphrase nor summary nor any other
such form, but a truly monstrous body.140
Catena is particularly scathing of the false translators of Aristotle, “who to a very great
extent and with great eloquence have translated him, thinking they were illustrating
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him”.141 His reasoning is quite singular: “philosophy is like an immaculate virgin that
loves neither compliment nor ornament”.142 Regarding scientiﬁc–philosophical texts,
Catena recommends that a vulgarization go straight to the heart of the content without
any rhetorical ornament whatsoever: “eloquence is not necessarily to be sought in the doc-
trines, or where truth only resides”.143 This is not to say that he is giving up on the rhetoric
of the discourse, however, which must be kept in the translation to reﬂect the original.
Catena openly attacks those who seek to translate an author’s arid voice with a style
that is ﬂowery and abundant just for the purpose of “being viewed as good Cicero-
nians”.144 Anyone who translates by departing signiﬁcantly from the words of the
author for the sake of rhetoric may consider themselves to be “ignorant” or
“forgers”.145 In this group, Catena points the ﬁnger at one translator of Aristotle in par-
ticular, Joachim Périon, who – as Charles B. Schmitt has pointed out – created with his
beautifully Ciceronian translation a full-blown “humanist Aristotle” in opposition to the
“scholastic Aristotle”, who at times is even more obscure.146 As Catena observes, the
style of Aristotle was “succinct and restrained”, while Cicero’s was “extremely elaborate
and abundant”: in order to be faithful to these two authors, therefore, one must translate
their works word-for-word in different ways.147
As we have seen, Catena’s interest in literal translation is due to the fact that it alone
renders the words of a discourse in a perfect way. It would however be misguided to
think that translation for Catena is a means of making the discourse of an author under-
standable, or even simply to make it more easily understood. To translate is most deﬁnitely
not to vulgarize in the broadest sense of clarifying or popularizing. There are instances in
which one can and must translate in an obscure manner, the most noteworthy example
being Heraclitus:
if I were to translate Heraclitus, and my translation were to remain obscure, what blame
would I have, given that Heraclitus wanted to write obscurely. On the contrary, it would
no longer be a composition of Heraclitus’s if I sought to open it up. This is the task of the
commentator, not the translator.148
One must therefore not confuse translation with other types of vulgarization, such as
epitome, summary and paraphrase, which have nothing at all to do with translation,
except perhaps free sense-translation, sensu lato, where texts “are not formally translated”.149
And it is precisely in order to distinguish literal translation from other forms of vulgar-
ization – sense-translation in particular – that Catena identiﬁes ﬁve speciﬁc types of word-
for-word translation:
When the layout is observed, and all the words are interpreted according to the order; when
one transposes, but all the words are translated; when each word has its correspondent of the
same quality; and even if it does not, the same Greek word is used; and of the language into
which one is translating […] the language of the orator […] which is done circuitously, […]
namely with a great roundabout use of words.150
As is to be expected, Catena doubts that the last two forms of translation are indeed word-
translations, suggesting rather that they fall under the broader umbrella of vulgarization,
which “belongs more properly to paraphrase, and to those who do epitome, and summary,
and breviarii”.151
So Catena identiﬁes three types of vulgarization, two of which are translations proper,
the third not. There is literal, word-for-word translation, which is pursued in order to stay
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faithful to the original text. There is also oratorical translation, similarly deﬁned as free,
where the aim is not to translate word-for-word but to deliver a translation of the text
that is faithful to form and structure, while focusing exclusively on the style of the
target language. Lastly, there is imitation, where the sense and the content of the text
are maintained without any concern for the form, structure, words or rhetoric of the dis-
course. These three types of translation may be traced back at least to humanism, for
instance the work of Emanuele Crisolara:
Manuel used to say about translation that to translate ad verbum into Latin [conversionem in
latinum ad verbum] was wholly ineﬀective. It was not only absurd, he averred, but even
sometimes, perverted the sense of the Greek. One must translate according to the sense
[transferre ad sententiam], he said; those who took pains with matters of this sort would
in this way make it a rule for themselves not to alter in any way the propriety of Greek
usage. For if anyone alter [immutarit] some [part] of Greek propriety with the object of
speaking more clearly and brilliantly to his own people [i.e. to those who spoke his own
language], he is playing the part of a commentator [exponentis] rather than of a translator
[interpretis].152
As Sabbadini has noted, “here in conversio ad verbum we can see literal interpretation, in
transferre ad sententiam faithful oratorical translation, in immutare the free oratorical
translation”.153 It is a singular inversion of values. Whereas Crisolara preferred oratorical
translation because it allowed him to showcase the beauty and eloquence of the Latin
language (we are referring here to translations from Greek into Latin), Catena believed
that literal translation was better for preserving the truth of the message. In this sense
Catena’s approach is no different from that of Piccolomini’s; whereas the latter believed
that the word was not indispensable for the transmission of the truth, in the opinion of
the former only the word could adequately express the truth of a text. Both, however,
wished above all to deliver the truth and the sense of the discourse of the author.
8. Conclusion: philologism of content
From this examination of the treatises that deal explicitly with the theory of vulgarization
and translation, we can state unequivocally that to vulgarize does not always mean to
transpose into the vernacular, namely to translate, but can sometimes also have the
broader meaning of popularizing. Hence not every translation is a vulgarization.
Experts have often held the view that the focus on translation, literal translation in par-
ticular, was a reaction to the spread of vulgarizations that seemed in one way or another to
betray the original text through ampliﬁcation or summary, sometimes even by completely
disrupting its content. This resistance undoubtedly echoes the intellectual debates that
were current at the time, but when taken to extremes it ends up obscuring the sense of
vulgarization and translation which everyone could agree upon, which was the manifes-
tation of the content of knowledge. Authors such as Piccolomini did so openly, without
concern for the words, and in this way were able to explore alternative forms of vulgariza-
tion. Those who had a more naturalistic conception of language, however, and believed in
an intrinsic correspondence between concept and word, tended more towards literal trans-
lation. The choice to translate word-for-word is dictated by a speciﬁc desire to convey the
truth expressed by the original text. One can speak in terms of philologism of content
rather than the word, by far the more common interpretation. What matters here is
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that we are not discerning a perspective in which external expression (the word) is privi-
leged over or juxtaposed with internal content (the concept). This would be to simplify the
positions of these authors. The word is always geared toward the transmission of the
content.
Hence we might be led to conclude that these authors, with their focus on the correspon-
dence between words and content, in some sense brought about a renaissance of the huma-
nistic ideal of the union between res and verba. Yet here too the conjecture would be
misleading. The purposes of the humanists were diﬀerent from those of the intellectuals
of the late Cinquecento; whereas the humanists preserved the unity of res and verba
because they were intent on a type of language that highlighted the eloquence of a discourse,
their later counterparts upheld the union of res and verba as the only means of rendering the
truth of the content with the utmost ﬁdelity. With the former there is an underlying Cicer-
onianism which is almost entirely absent in the case of the latter.
Ultimately, then, what did it mean to vulgarize in the Renaissance? As regards both
translations – of whichever kind – and other forms of vulgarization, it meant rendering
in the vernacular for the purpose of making content more accessible. Content is never
at the expense of rhetoric or the eloquence of the discourse. What matters most is the
transmission of sense, and in order to transmit sense it is legitimate also – in the more
extreme cases – to abandon literal translation, which can be cumbersome, and embrace
free forms of vulgarization. Naturally, vulgarizers were also aware that this would lead
to a betrayal – but betrayal, as mentioned at the outset, can also lead to new traditions
and ideas, an acceptable sacriﬁce for the advancement of knowledge.
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